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Introduction

The subject chosen for this presentation is dispute resolution under MERCOSUR.
This system, like all of MERCOSUR, is in a process of evolution and consolidation. In
February 2002, the party States agreed to approve the Olivos Protocol. This protocol
provides for the existence of a permanent dispute resolution tribunal, with a view to
unifying jurisprudence on matters derived from the MERCOSUR legal framework.
Moreover, to date there have been seven awards by ad-hoc arbitral tribunals (two of
which I had the honor of sitting on) from which certain lessons can be drawn regarding
current operation of the dispute resolution system. Before beginning my analysis of the
subject that brings us here, I believe it is necessary to make some brief comments on
the history of MERCOSUR, and the current status of the process.

II. What is MERCOSUR?
MERCOSUR is a union of States having legal personality under International Law,'
whose origin is the Asunci6n Treaty of March 26, 1991. The treaty was executed by the
governments of Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay, and Uruguay.
Under the Asunci6n Treaty, the party States established the bases for the gradual and
progressive creation of a subregional common market.2 These bases are: free circulation
of goods, services and factors of production; establishment of a common external tariff
and adoption of common trade policies; coordination of macroeconomic and
3 sectorial
policies; and commitment by the party States to harmonize their legislations.
MERCOSUR is the world's fourth largest trading power, after the United States, the
European Union, and Japan. It covers an area of twelve million square kilometers (70 percent of the total of South America), and has a population of 200 million inhabitants.

1.
2.

Protocol of Ouro Preto, Dec. 17, 1994, art. 34, 34 I.L.M. 1244 (1995) (Additional Protocol
to the Treaty of Asuncion on the Institutional Structure of MERCOSUR) [hereinafter Ouro
Preto].
Hector Gros Espiell, El Tratado de Asunci6n, MONTEVIDEO: INSTITUTO
SARIALES DE MONTEVIDEO,

3.

DE

ESTUDIos EMPRE-

1991, at 25. Professor Hdctor Gros Espiell was also Uruguay's

Minister of Foreign Affairs who signed the Asunci6n Treaty.
Treaty of Asunci6n, Mar. 26, 1991, art. 1, 30 I.L.M. 1041, available at http://www.mercosurcomisec.gub.uy/DOCUMENT/TRATADOA/Asuncion.htm (last visited Oct. 2, 2002).
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MERCOSUR's Gross Domestic Product (GDP) of close to one trillion U.S. dollars represents 80 percent of South America's GDP.4
The Asunci6n Treaty, in an excess of optimism, established a transition period
through December 31, 1994, to put the common market into operation.5 Prior to expiration of that term, in view of the status of the market consolidation process, the party
States agreed to extend the term for reduction of internal tariffs until 2000.6 The term
for culmination of the process for setting the common external tariff was extended until
2006,' with the transitory and primary goal of bringing into operation a customs union
amongst the party States.
While the States made major efforts to facilitate circulation of goods and to apply
a common external tariff, they paid less attention to coordinating their macroeconomic
policies and to harmonizing their legislations. This turned out to be a weakness of the
system, since Brazil's devaluation at the outset of 1999, and the collapse of Argentina's
economic system in 2001, substantially altered trading conditions in the region. It also
led to regression in the integration process, with the States imposing tariff and non-tariff
measures as protection against these distortions.
MERCOSUR's legal framework is based, in addition to the Asunci6n Treaty, on two
other agreements of the party States: the 1991 Brasilia Protocol on dispute resolution
(which will be replaced by the recent Olivos Protocol when it is ratified by all of the
parties) and the 1994 Ouro Preto Protocol. The Ouro Preto Protocol primarily regulates MERCOSUR's institutional structure:' recognizing MERCOSUR's legal personality;
defining the decision-making process; 9 establishing the system for internal application of
rules issued by MERCOSUR bodies;' and determining their legal sources."

4.

5.
6.

Id.

Id. art. 3.
Common Market Council Decision 5/94, available at http://www.sice.oas.org/trade/mrcsrs/
decisions/DEC594.asp (last visited Oct. 1, 2002).
7. Common Market Council Decisions 7/94, available at http://www.sice.oas.org/trade/mrcsrs/
decisions/DEC794.asp (last visited Oct. 2, 2002).
8. The Ouro Preto Protocol provides for existence of the following bodies: the Common Market
Council (CMC), the Common Market Group (GMC), the MERCOSUR Trade Commission (CCM), the Joint Parliamentary Commission (CPC), the Economic-Social Consultative
Forum (FCES), and the MERCOSUR Administrative Secretariat (SAM). See, e.g., Ouro Preto,
supra note 1.
9. In MERCOSUR decisions are made by consensus and with the presence of all party States.
Ouro Preto, supra note 1, art. 37.
10. Resolutions by MERCOSUR bodies are not applied directly in the party States, but instead
must be incorporated in the respective national legislations. The effectiveness of the rules
is simultaneous, 30 days following notification by all of the States of incorporation of the
provision. Id. arts. 38, 40.
11. The legal sources of MERCOSUR are: 1) the Asunci6n Treaty, its protocols and additional
or supplementary instruments; 2) the agreements executed within the framework of the
Asunci6n Treaty and its protocols; 3) the Decisions of the Common Market Council, the
Resolutions of the Common Market Group and the Directives of the MERCOSUR Trade
Commission. Id. art. 41. To these sources the Brasilia Protocol added the applicable principles
and provisions of international law on the subject. Protocol of Brasilia for the Settlement of
Disputes, Dec. 17, 1991, art. 19, 36 I.L.M. 69 (1997) [hereinafter Brasilia Protocol].
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Evolution of Dispute Resolution System

The same gradualist and progressive system used by the States in building the MERCOSUR legal framework was applied to the dispute resolution system. Attachment III to
the Asunci6n Treaty established an elementary procedure, of a nonjurisdictional nature,
to settle disputes arising between the party States as a consequence of Treaty application.
This procedure involved three stages: direct negotiations between the parties; consideration of the controversy by the Common Market Group 12 (which could call on panels or
groups of experts and make recommendations within a period of sixty days); and, in the
event of failure of the latter, submission of the dispute to the Common Market Council
to adopt the pertinent recommendations.' 3
Insofar as all the decisions of the Common Market Council and the Common Market Group must be adopted by consensus and with the presence of all the party States,
the system's effectiveness was relative, since it gave the litigant States a sort of veto right.
Nevertheless, this regimen was in place from November 29, 1991, the date of effectiveness of the Asunci6n Treaty, through April 22, 1993, when the Brasilia Protocol took
effect.
The Brasilia Protocol, approved directly by the States on December 17, 1991, is
formally a supplementary treaty to the 1991 Asunci6n Treaty. For the first time, it incorporates a jurisdictional procedure for resolving disputes deriving from interpretation,
application, or noncompliance with the rules of the Asunci6n Treaty, the agreements
executed within its framework, the decisions of the Common Market Council, and the
resolutions of the Common Market Group. This procedure is based fundamentally on
the operation of ad-hoc arbitral tribunals.
The Brasilia Protocol, regulated by a Common Market Council decision of December 10, 1998, is the current regimen for dispute resolution. It will be replaced by the
regimen approved in the Olivos Protocol on February 18, 2002, thirty days after ratification by all the party States. The big innovations of the Olivos Protocol are the creation
of a Permanent Review Tribunal, and the possibility of appealing for review of awards
made by ad-hoc tribunals. Within the framework of the Brasilia Protocol, twenty disputes between party States were filed, seven arbitral tribunal awards were handed down,
and two expert groups were called to meet.
The Ouro Preto Protocol introduced the only change in the Brasilia Protocol regimen. The latter includes the directives of the MERCOSUR Trade Commission among
the provisions that can be the subject of dispute within the Brasilia framework. 4
In synthesis, the MERCOSUR dispute resolution mechanism includes three stages:
the pre-jurisdictional stage under Attachment III to the Asunci6n Treaty; the ad-hoc

12.

The Common Market Group (GMC), provided for in the Asunci6n Treaty and reiterated
in the Ouro Preto Protocol, is MERCOSJR's executive body and consists of four official
members and four alternates per country, representatives of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs,
the Ministry of the Economy and the Central Bank.
13. The Common Market Council (CMC), provided for in the Asunci6n Treaty and reiterated in
the Ouro Preto Protocol, is MERCOSUR's highest ranking body and consists of the Ministers
of Foreign Affairs and the Ministers of Economy of the party States.
14. The Attachment to the Ouro Preto Protocol also establishes a non-jurisdictional procedure
for claims by party States and private parties before the MERCOSUR Trade Commission.
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tribunal stage under the Brasilia Protocol; and the Permanent Review Tribunal under
the Olivos Protocol. We will now analyze the regimen of the Brasilia Protocol, and the
problems posed by its application, pointing out the changes introduced by the Olivos
Protocol, and concluding with a general assessment of the system.

IV. The Brasilia Protocol System
The Brasilia Protocol establishes two different procedures; depending on whether
the disputes are controversies between MERCOSUR party States or claims by private
parties.
A.

DISPUTES BETWEEN PARTY STATES

1. Sphere of Application
This Protocol applies to disputes arising between party States as to the interpretation, application or nonfulfillment of the provisions of the Asunci6n Treaty and the
agreements executed within its framework. It includes the Decisions of the Common
Market Council, the Resolutions of the Common Market Group, and the Directives of
the MERCOSUR Trade Commission.'
Consequently, the Brasilia Protocol regimen does not include disputes between a
party State and MERCOSUR or one of its bodies, conflicts of provisions between MERCOSUR rules and the legislations of each party State, controversies between MERCOSUR
and MERCOSUR bodies, or conflicts between the bodies of MERCOSUR
employees
itself.'6
2. Stages of the Procedure
The Brasilia Protocol provides for three stages, each of which must be completed
before moving on to the next. The stages are: 17direct negotiations; intervention of Common Market Group; and arbitral proceedings.
a.

Direct Negotiations

These are informal negotiations between the States in an effort to find a solution
for the dispute by mutual agreement. The States must keep the Common Market Group
informed, and cannot exceed fifteen days in such negotiations.'8

15.
16.

Brasilia Protocol, supra note 11, art. 1, Ouro Preto, supra note 1, art. 43.
Badan D. Opertti, Sistema de Solucidn de Controversias en el MERCOSUR, in AVANCES DEL
DERECHO INTERNACIONAL PRIVADO EN AMfRICA LATINA. Liber Amicorum IiJrgen Samtleben,
Max Planck Institut-Fundaci6n de Cultura Universitaria, Montevideo, 2002, p. 458.

17.

Brasilia Protocol, supra note 11, art. 3.

18.

Id. art. 3.
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Intervention of Common Market Group
When no agreement is reached via direct negotiations, either of the party States may
submit the dispute to the consideration of the Common Market Group. The Common
Market Group does not adopt a Resolution that is binding upon the party States, but
instead is limited to making recommendations to surmount the dispute, and can also20
obtain expert advice. 9 This stage of the procedure cannot take more than thirty days.
b.

c.

Arbitral Proceeding

After completing the previous non-jurisdictional stages without the dispute being
settled, either of the party States involved in the controversy can bring an arbitral
proceeding.
3. Features of the Arbitral Proceeding
The main features of the arbitral proceeding established by the Brasilia Protocol are
as follows:
* It is an ad-hoc Arbitral Tribunal, consisting of three arbitrators: one appointed
by each party State and the third by mutual agreement between them. If no
agreement is reached, the third arbitrator may be appointed by drawing of lots
by the MERCOSUR Administrative Secretariat, from among a list of sixteen
arbitrators previously drawn up by all of the party States.2
* The Tribunal establishes its own rules of procedure. The provisions require that
each party must have full opportunity to be heard and to present its arguments,
and that the proceedings must be expeditious.22 The Arbitral Tribunal must
issue its award within a term of sixty days, extendible for a maximum of thirty
days, from the date of appointment of the Presiding Arbitrator.23
* At the request of the interested party the tribunal may issue provisional measures when there are well-founded presumptions that maintenance of the situa24
tion would give rise to serious and irreparable damages for one of the parties.
The Arbitral Tribunal will decide the controversy on the basis of the provisions
of the Asunci6n Treaty, the agreements executed within the framework of the treaty,
the decisions of the Common Market Council, the resolutions of the Common Market
Group, and the applicable principles and provisions of international public law.25 To
these sources the Ouro Preto Protocol added the directives of the MERCOSUR Trade
27
Commission. 26 The Tribunal may also decide "ex aequo et bono,' if the parties so agree

19. Id. arts. 4, 5.
20. Id. art. 6.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.

Id. arts. 9, 12
Id. art. 15.
Id. art. 20.
Id. art. 18.
Id. art. 19.
Ouro Preto, supra note 1, art. 41.
Brasilia Protocol, supra note 11, art. 19.
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B.

Regarding the seat of Tribunals, while the Brasilia Protocol provided that they
could be established in any of the party States, 28 CMC Decision 28/94, adopted
under the Ouro Preto Protocol, provided that they are to be located in the city
of Asunci6n (Paraguay).
The Arbitral Tribunal's award must be issued by a majority.29 The award can
not be appealed. It is binding upon the litigant party States, and vis-k-vis same
shall have the force of res judicata.
It must be fulfilled within a period of fifteen days, unless the Arbitral Tribunal
sets a different term.30 Within fifteen days following notice of the award, any of
the parties may request clarification thereof, or an interpretation as to how it
must be fulfilled. The Tribunal must respond within the following fifteen days,
and may temporarily suspend compliance with the award. 31 If a State does not
comply with the award within thirty days, the other party States may adopt
measures, such as suspension of concessions, tending
temporary compensatory
32
to obtain compliance.
Each party State is obligated to pay the expenses of the arbitrator it appoints.
Monetary compensation to the Presiding Arbitrator and the Tribunal's expenses
by the litigant party States, unless the Tribunal distributes
shall be shared equally
33
them otherwise.
CLAIMS BY PRIVATE PARTIES

1. Sphere of Application
The Brasilia Protocol does not provide for any procedure whereby private individuals
or legal entities of any of the party States, or other States, can bring claims against acts by
MERCOSUR bodies. The Protocol establishes a special regimen only for claims deriving
from sanction or application by any of the States of legal or administrative measures
having an effect of restriction, discrimination, or unfair competition in violation of
the Asunci6n Treaty. The protocol also establishes a regimen for claims deriving from
agreements executed within its framework, decisions by the Common Market Council,
or resolutions by the Common Market Group.34
In the MERCOSUR dispute resolution system, however, private parties do not have
direct access to justice. Instead private parties must submit their claims to the National
Section of the Common Market Group, which must support the claim. Additionally, if
the claim is accepted, it will be the competence of the party States to request action
thereon.
Unlike party States, private parties will always have the possibility of settling their
differences with other private parties of the party States, or with the States themselves
through the judicial or arbitral procedures, provided for in extra-MERCOSUR legislation.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.

Id. art. 15.

33.

Id. art. 24.

Id. art.
Id. art.
Id. art.
Id. art.

20.
21.
22.
23.

34. Id. art. 25.

542

Law and Business Review of the Americas
2.

Stages of the Procedure

The stages provided for in the Brasilia Protocol for private claims are as follows:
* Claims must be submitted by private parties to the National Section of the
Common Market Group in the State of their habitual residence or place of
business.35
* If the National Section decides to support the claim, in consultation with the
affected private party, it may establish direct contacts with the National Section
of the Common Market Group of the party State to which the violation is
attributed, or bring such claim without further ado before the Common Market
Group.3 6
* If the direct contacts between the National Sections do not solve the problem
within fifteen days, or if the issue is submitted directly, the Common Market
Group may decide (unanimously and with the presence of all the States) that
37
the requirements for processing the claim are not met and reject the claim.
* If it does not reject the claim, the Common Market Group is to call a Group of
Experts. Three experts are to be appointed by vote, from the list of candidates
proposed by the States. The Group of Experts will give the private claimant,
and the State against which the claim is being made the chance to be heard.
The Group of38Experts must then issue a decision within a nonextendible term
of thirty days.
* If the Group of Experts decides the claim is justified, any party State may require
the State against which the claim was brought to adopt corrective measures, or
eliminate the questioned measures. If the requirement is not met within a term
39
of fifteen days, the claim can be submitted directly to the arbitral procedure.

V. Adjustments to the Brasilia System Made in Ouro Preto
The Ouro Preto Protocol ratified the Brasilia dispute resolution system, underscoring
that it is a transitory system. Therefore, prior to culminating the process of Common
External Tariff convergence, the party States will review the Brasilia dispute resolution
system with a view to establishing a permanent system. 40 The Ouro Preto Protocol
defines the organic structure of MERCOSUR. It incorporates new bodies, including the
MERCOSUR Trade Commission, which has rule-setting powers through the issuance
of Directives, and in that framework establishes a non-jurisdictional dispute resolution
mechanism.
The MERCOSUR Trade Commission was created for the purpose of ensuring application of the common trade policy instruments agreed to by the party States for the
customs union. 1 In the areas of its competence, it can hear and decide claims submitted
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.

Id. art. 26.
Id. art. 27.
Id. art. 29.
Id. art. 29, paras. 2, 3.
Id. art. 32.
Ouro Preto, supra note 1, art. 21.
Id. art. 16.
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by National Sections on behalf of party States or private claimants.42 The main feature
of this system is that, while the decisions of the MERCOSUR Trade Commission must
be adopted by consensus, their regulation does not require the presence of all the party
States, and the Commission can function with only three members. Analysis of claims
within the framework of the MERCOSUR Trade Commission does not prevent action
by the party State that made the claim under the regimen of the Brasilia Protocol43
The Experience of the Brasilia Protocol
Dispute Resolution System

VI.

Beyond the precariousness and transitory nature of the regimen, the Brasilia Protocol
dispute resolution system was an efficient route for resolving numerous controversies
between the party States of MERCOSUR. To date, twenty disputes have been submitted
by party States, seven of which ended in Arbitral Tribunal awards, and two in Expert
Group opinions. The arbitral awards issued have covered diverse areas of the relationships
among the party States, and have established precedents of jurisprudence in the disputes
submitted by them. The binding force of such awards is limited to the arbitral proceeding
in which they are issued. However, the awards have frequently been grounded, regarding
specific points, on the precedents of the decisions by previous Arbitral Tribunals (which,
de facto, contributes to shaping community jurisprudence.)
The issues resolved in the awards have been as follows:
Number

Date

Parties

Issue

Award 1

4/28/99

Argentina v. Brazil

Obligation to eliminate non-tariff restrictions in the
light of postponement of the project for formation
of a common market and right to apply non-tariff
restrictions under the 1980 Montevideo Treaty (art.
50).

Award 2

9/27/99

Argentina v. Brazil

Compatibility of MERCOSUR regimen with existence

Award 3

2/10/00

Brazil v. Argentina

Compatibility of MERCOSUR regimen with application

Award 4

5/21/01

Brazil v. Argentina

Award 5

9/29/01

Uruguay v. Argentina

Award 6

1/9/02

Uruguay v. Brazil

Award 7

4/19/02

Argentina v. Brazil

of subsidies for pork production and exportation.

42. Id. art. 21.
43. Ouro Preto, supra note 1, art. 21.

of safeguard measures for textile products.
Compatibility of MERCOSUR regimen with application of antidumping measures against exportation
of whole chicken.
Value of origin certificate issued by authorized certifying authorities and right of States to not recognize
origin certificate.
Compatibility of MERCOSUR regimen with prohibition of importation of retreaded tires.
Term for incorporation in internal law of rules on
phytosanitary product registration and scope of the
non-tariff restriction under the 1980 Montevideo
Treaty (art. 50).
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Beyond the specific issues considered in the awards, a series of characteristic features
can be noted in them:

*
*
*
•
*
*

*
*
*

VII.

The independence of the arbitrators, including those appointed by the party
States, as is dearly evidenced by the fact that six of the seven awards issued
were unanimously approved.
Formal adherence to a contradictory procedure, with guarantees for the defense
of all parties. Notwithstanding this fact, in all cases the Tribunals had to use the
extension of time provided for in the Brasilia Protocol.
Use of the MERCOSUR Administrative Secretariat for notices and communications to the parties, as well as to receive documents and communications from
the parties.
Confidentiality of all proceedings, with the exception of the contents of the
arbitral award.
Reference to precedents of previous awards by Arbitral Tribunals.
Absence of contradictory solutions among the awards issued.
Application of teleological criterion for interpretation of the provisions of the
Asunci6n Treaty, the agreements executed within its framework, and the decisions of MERCOSUR bodies, in all cases in line with the regimen's integrationist
purpose.
Upholding of the general principle of free trade and restrictive interpretation of
all limitations on free traffic of goods.
Application of the general principles of international law: pacta sund servanda,
reasonability and good faith, as criteria for interpretation and integration of the
MERCOSUR legal framework.
Harmonization of MERCOSUR rules with the other provisions of international
law to which the party States are subject.

Assessment of the Brasilia Protocol System

The Brasilia Protocol dispute resolution system has been criticized frequently. The
main objection focuses on its ad-hoc arbitral system, which implies the appointment
of different arbitrators in each case. This ad-hoc system, in contrast with a Permanent
Tribunal, hinders existence of unified and constant jurisprudence. 4 It has also been
said that the ad-hoc Brasilia system terminates with issuance of the award. There is no
provision for the Tribunal's subsistence for the purposes of resolving any controversies
that may arise during compliance with the award.4"
The Brasilia Protocol system is limited to providing a solution for disputes arising
between party states as to interpretation, application or nonfulfillment of the provisions
of the Asunci6n Treaty, the agreements executed within its framework, and the decisions of MERCOSUR bodies. The Brasilia Protocol does not cover controversies that
44.

Mingarro L. Marti, Perfeccionamientodel sistema de soluci6n de controversias en el MERCOSUR, in SoLucI6N DE CONTROVERSIAS EN EL MERCOSUR, COMPILAER: Ruiz DIAz LABRANO,
R. Asunci6n, 1991, p. 17 et seq.

45.

J. C. Blanco, Soluci6n de controversias en el MERCOSUR, p. 71 et seq.
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may arise between a party State and MERCOSUR, or one of its bodies; conflicts of provisions between the MERCOSUR legal framework, and the law of each party State; disputes between MERCOSUR employees and MERCOSUR bodies; and conflicts between
the bodies of MERCOSUR itself."
Critics have also pointed out that private claimants cannot access dispute resolution

mechanisms directly, and that to gain access, the party State must adopt the political
decision to support their claims. Moreover, the pertinent National Section must resolve
and actively defend the claims
to put the dispute resolution mechanism into motion,
47
within the framework of the established procedure.
From the procedural standpoint, critics have pointed to the shortness of the sixtyday term (even if extendible for an additional thirty days) to carry out the total arbitral
proceeding and issue the award. Also criticized is the lack of a procedure in the event
of the nullity of the award. This would occur if the award is issued beyond that term,
or on matters not submitted to its decision.4 Some of these criticisms were addressed
in the changes to the dispute resolution system approved in the Olivos Protocol, while
others are still pending consideration. Nevertheless, it is important to note that, beyond
its imperfections and shortcomings, the Brasilia Protocol dispute resolution system represented, and continues to represent, an efficient procedure for resolving controversies
within the framework of MERCOSUR.

VIII.

Innovations of the Olivos Protocol

On February 18, 2002, the MERCOSUR party States approved a new dispute resolution regimen called the Olivos Protocol. It is based on the Brasilia Protocol, but makes
some significant changes in the functioning of the system. The Olivos Protocol system
continues to be a transitory regimen, which the parties have agreed to review prior to
the completion of the common external tariff convergence process. 49 The Olivos Protocol
will take effect thirty days following submission of the last ratification instrument.'0 Submission of ratification instruments requires the approval of the Parliaments of the party

States.
As to its effectiveness, the Olivos Protocol will derogate the Brasilia Protocol, and
the new system will apply to disputes raised after the Olivos Protocol takes effect. 5'

46. Opertti, supra note 16.
47. Id.
48. MICHELSON, G., Perfeccionamiento del Protocolo de Brasilia, in Soluci6n de Controversias,
p. 23 et seq.
49. Protocolo de Olivos Para la Solucion de Controversias en el MERCOSUR, Feb. 18, 2002,
art. 53, available at http://www.mercosur.org.uy/espanol/snorlvarios/protocolo olivos_2002
(last visited Oct. 2, 2001) [hereinafter Olivos Protocol].
50. Id. art. 52.
51. Id. art. 55.
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The Distinction between the Regimen Applicable
to Disputes between Party States and Those Deriving
from Private Claims Has Been Maintained

IX.

A.

DISPUTES BETWEEN PARTY STATES

1. Sphere of Application
The Olivos Protocol substantially maintains the rules of the Brasilia Protocol, with
the adjustments that had been made by the Ouro Preto Protocol. The Olivos Protocol
dispute resolution regimen applies to: disputes arising between the party States on the
interpretation, application or non-fulfillment of the Asunci6n Treaty, the Ouro Preto
Protocol, the protocols and agreements executed within the framework of the Asunci6n
Treaty; the Decisions of the Common Market Council; the Resolutions of the Common
Market Group; and the Directives of the MERCOSUR Trade Commission.52 The Olivos
Protocol adds a special solution for those cases where the disputes raised can also be
submitted to the dispute resolution system of the World Trade Organization, or other
preferential trade mechanisms of which the party States may individually be members.
In these cases the Protocol establishes that the party making the claim must choose
to submit to one forum or the other, without prejudice to the fact that the litigant parties
may, by mutual agreement, choose the forum. Nevertheless, once the dispute resolution
resort to the mechanisms established
proceeding has begun, neither of the parties may
53
in the other forums regarding the same matter.
Mechanisms Relative to TechnicalAspects
and Consultative Opinions
The Olivos Protocol delegates to the Common Market Council the authority to
establish two special procedures not provided for in the previous regimen: establishment of expeditious mechanisms to resolve differences between the party States, as to
technical aspects regulated in common trade policy instruments,5' and establishment of
mechanisms for requesting consultative opinions from the Permanent Review Tribunal."
2.

3. Stages of the Procedute
The Olivos Protocol provides for four procedural stages, although not all of them
are mandatory. The four stages are: direct negotiations; Common Market Group Intervention; ad-hoc arbitral proceedings; and review proceedings.
a.

Direct Negotiations

This is an obligatory stage, with the same features as the Brasilia Protocol.

52.

Id. art. 1, para. 1.

53.

Id. art. 1, para. 2.

54.

Id. art. 2.

55.

Id. art. 3.
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b. Common Market Group Intervention
This has to be converted into an optional stage, which the parties can access by
mutual agreement. Controversies can also be brought before the Common Market Group
if another State, not a party to the
5 6 dispute, justifiably requires that procedure upon

termination of direct negotiations.

c. Ad-Hoc Arbitral Proceeding
This proceeding is maintained with features substantially similar to the Brasilia
Protocol.

d. Review Proceeding
The new protocol incorporates the recourse for review against ad-hoc Arbitral Tribunal awards, on questions of law, before the Permanent Review Tribunal. The new
regimen, deriving from the harmonization of both proceedings, requires special analysis.
4. Features of Ad-Hoc Arbitral Proceeding
The basic structure of the arbitral proceeding maintains the general features of the
Brasilia Protocol, with the following changes:
* Institutionalization of the participation of the MERCOSUR Administrative Secis responsible for the administrative procedures required for the
retariat, which
57
proceedings.
* Ad-hoc Arbitral Tribunals can meet in any city of the MERCOSUR party States,
and Asunci6n is the exclusive obligatory location for the Permanent Review
Tribunal."8
* The subject of the dispute is determined by the submission and response briefs
submitted to the ad-hoc Arbitral Tribunal and cannot be expanded subsequently.5 9 This resolves the doubts arising in connection with some of the
arbitral awards as to whether the subject of the dispute was limited to the submission and response briefs, or the questions raised in the initial mandatory
stages.
* If the ad-hoc Arbitral Tribunal issues provisional measures and the award is the
subject of an appeal for review, the measures will be maintained until they are
taken up at the first meeting of the Permanent Review Tribunal, which must
decide on continuation or termination thereof' 6
The sixty-day term for issuance of the arbitral award, extendible for a maximum
of thirty days, has been maintained. Nevertheless, this term is now counted as of the
communication by the MERCOSUR Administrative Secretariat to the parties and the
informing them of acceptance by the Presiding arbitrator of his or her
other arbitrators,
6
appointment.
56. Id. art.
57. Id. art.
58. id. art.
59. Id. art.
60. Id. art.
61.

1

6, paras. 2, 3.
9, para. 3.
38.

14, para. 1.
15, para. 3.

Id. art. 16.

548

Law and Business Review of the Americas

5. Review Proceeding Features
The procedure for review and creation of the Permanent Review Tribunal are two
major innovations of the Olivos Protocol. Ad-hoc arbitration ceased to be a singleinstance proceeding, and now an appeal for review can be brought, on questions of
law, before a Permanent Tribunal. This is undoubtedly a very important step in the
MERCOSUR dispute resolution process, which seeks to create a jurisdictional body that
provides for uniformity of jurisprudence, making the regimen foreseeable and certain.
This solution, based on a proposal presented by Uruguay,62 seeks to align MERCOSUR
procedures with the successful model of the Court of Justice of the European Union. The
Court of Justice has played and continues to play a fundamental role in the development
and consolidation of basic principles of the European community system. 63
The Permanent Review Tribunal is to consist of five arbitrators," who must be
available on a permanent basis, 65 and has its seat in the city of Asunci6n. 66 Each party
State is to appoint one arbitrator and an alternate for a two-year period, renewable
for up to two successive periods. 67 The fifth arbitrator must be of the nationality of
one of the party states, and will be appointed by unanimous decision of the States. If
no unanimous agreement exists, she or he will be appointed at random from among
candidates included in the lists provided by the party States." When disputes involve
two party States, the Tribunal will consist of two national arbitrators of the party states,
and a third and Presiding Arbitrator of the Tribunal will be designated at random from
among the remaining arbitrators appointed. 9 In essence, the tribunal continues to be
ad-hoc, since its composition can vary from one controversy to the other. When the
dispute involves more than two party States, the Permanent Review Tribunal shall consist
of the five arbitrators.7" The Permanent Review Tribunal may confirm, modify, or renew
the legal foundations and decisions of the ad-hoc Arbitral Tribunal, and its award is
final. 71 The Olivos Protocol also provides the possibility of the parties' direct access to the
Permanent Review Tribunal, if expressly agreed to by them. In this case, the Permanent
Review Tribunal shall have the same competencies as the ad-hoc Arbitral Tribunal. 2
6. Execution of Awards
In general terms, the Olivos Protocol follows the regimen established by the Brasilia
Protocol regarding adoption, the binding nature of the awards, and appeal for clarification and term for compliance with the award. The Olivos Protocol clarifies, if an appeal
62. Opertti, supra note 16, at 467-68.
63. RIECHENBERG, K., El Tribunal de Justicia de la Uni6n Europea, in Soluci6n de controversias,
p. 89 et seq.

64. Olivos Protocol, supra note 49, art. 18, para. 1.
65. Id. art. 19.
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.

Id. art.
Id. art.
Id. art.
Id. art.
Id. art.
Id. art.
Id. art.

38.
18,
18,
20,
20,
22.
23.

para.
para.
para.
para.

2.
3.
1.
2.
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is brought for review, compliance with the award of the ad-hoc Arbitral Tribunal will be
suspended while the review is underway.73 Nevertheless, the Olivos Protocol incorporates
the possibility for the Tribunal that issued the award to continue its competence during
the period of compliance with it. There are two major provisions on this issue:
If the State benefited by the award considers that the measures adopted do not
comply with the award, it can appear again before74the ad-hoc Arbitral Tribunal
or the Permanent Review Tribunal, as applicable.
It also provides that if the State benefited by the award has imposed compensatory measures on the opposing State, because it understands that the award
has not been complied with, the latter can petition the Tribunal to rule on
whether the measures adopted to comply with the award are satisfactory, and
whether the compensatory measures adopted are appropriate and in line with
the noncompliance attributed to it.75
Both solutions imply a major qualitative change in the current system, where the
action of the Arbitral Tribunal ends with issuance of the award and, in some cases, a
clarifying award. Under the Olivos Protocol, the competence of the Tribunal can extend
during the period of compliance with the award.
While the Tribunal continues to lack the power of imperium to force the party States
to comply with the award, the Olivos Protocol continues to give it the competence to
resolve conflicts, as to whether there has been compliance with the award, and whether
compensatory measures imposed by the State demanding compliance are appropriate.
B.

CLAIMS BY PRIVATE PARTIES

For submission of private disputes to the MERCOSUR Tribunals, the resolution system continues to require the respective party State to adopt a political decision. The
political decision must support the claim, and bring the pertinent actions through the
inter-State dispute resolution system. The Olivos Protocol does not facilitate an effective
system to provide direct access by private parties to the MERCOSUR dispute resolution
bodies. Instead, it substantially maintains the regimen established by the Brasilia Protocol, while incorporating some small changes that further reduce the system's effectiveness:
* The National Section of the Common Market Group--once it has decided to
admit the claim-must go through the process of direct consultations with the
National Section of the Party State, to which the violation is attributed, before
bringing the claim before the Common Market77 Group.76 Yet under the Brasilia
Protocol it had the possibility of direct access.
* Only unanimous opinions of Expert Groups can be brought to bear against the
State against which the claim is brought, 7 while under the Brasilia
Protocol this
79
was also possible in the case of opinions adopted by a majority.
73.

Id. art. 29, para. 2.

74.
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.

Id. art. 30.
Id. art. 32.
Id. art. 41.
Brasilia Protocol, supra note 11, art. 27.
Olivos Protocol, supra note 49, art. 44.
Brasilia Protocol, supra note 11, art. 32(a).
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In essence, the new Protocol maintains and strengthens the concept that private
access to MERCOSUR dispute resolution mechanisms depends on the political will of
the States.

X.

Final Consideration

The Olivos Protocol undoubtedly constitutes progress toward establishment of an
appropriate dispute resolution system in MERCOSUR. It seeks to resolve two of the
main criticisms of the Brasilia Protocol system: first, the lack of a Permanent Tribunal to
set the course of jurisprudence in MERCOSUR; and second, the establishment of a legal
oversight mechanism to assess compliance with awards and any compensatory measures
adopted when awards are not fulfilled. Nevertheless, the Olivos Protocol leaves pending
an unquestionably important issue that MERCOSUR must necessarily come to terms
with: private access to justice. MERCOSUR has evolved as an eminently commercial
agreement that seeks to enhance and foster trade among economic agents in an integrated
market. Thus, the real protagonists of this process are' not the States, but instead the
economic agents operating within the framework of the agreed to regulations. From
this standpoint, for proper development of the market, it is fundamental for economic
agents to have a mechanism for protection of their commercial and economic rights that
allows them to directly defend their own interests. Subjecting these defense mechanisms
to the political will of the States constitutes a very important limitation for ensuring
appropriate protection.
It is undeniable that, to date, the Brasilia Protocol system made possible the solving
of numerous problems, some of which ended in awards by ad-hoc Arbitral Tribunals,
and others of which were resolved amicably by the States at earlier stages. This system,
of a provisional nature, made it possible to start out on the difficult road of acknowledgment by the States, of the existence of restrictions on their sovereignty, deriving from
the process of integration on which they have embarked. It is to be expected that the
innovations deriving from the Olivos Protocol will improve the system's operation, surmounting some of its imperfections. However, we must not lose sight of the fact that this
transitory system must be replaced by a permanent one, whose discussion and design
must necessarily take into account the jurisdictional protection of private parties.

